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ABSTRACT 
At the beginning of the 80s, the Chilean government  handed over the administration of public 
schools to municipal governments and established a voucher per student type of funding. By 
running an empirical model that uses a panel of municipal observations between 2005 and 2011, 
we intend to explain the average municipal score achieved by public schools on the so called 
"SIMCE" test, which  measures math and language skills at the 4th degree. Our empirical analysis 
suggests that; i) more "fiscally empowered" and "accountable" local governments perform better, 
ii) competition from publicly funded private schools enhances municipal schools' performance, iii) 
benefits from decentralization appear to diminish as the number of schools per municipal 
jurisdiction raises and, iv) socio economic variables are globally and individually significant.  
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I. Introduction. 
 
By the beginning of the 80s, Chile underwent a  deep municipal level decentralization 
reform. It mainly consisted in handing over to municipal governments the administration 
of schools and primary health centers. Ever since, public schools came to be named as 
"municipal schools" (MSs). Originally, municipal governments were allowed to choose 
between direct school administration or delegate it on to nonprofit private organizations 
called “corporations”, which were meant to take advantage from private like management 
practices. Since above reforms took place, basic school funding hinges on a centrally 
assigned voucher per student which is differentiated in accordance to the students being 
attended, this being given to municipalities upon pupil’s attendance to classes (e.i. Aedo 
and Sapelli 2001).  A parallel model of publicly funded education exists in the form of 
private subsidized schools (PSs).  Although they are voucher eligible in a similar way as 
MSs do, these private "providers" are allowed to partially charge for each student in 
return for a reduced voucher value. A third track of providers is represented by fully paid 
private schools. Above described model is assumed to promote school competition, local 
government's accountability and better quality public schools. 
 
While the Chilean case has been widely studied, no clear cut evidence exists that relates 
municipal fiscal autonomy with more residents’ voice and stronger accountability of 
authorities to their local constituency. In dealing with above questions, two 
complementary approaches are explored in this present paper. One follows Barankay and 
Lockhood (2007) in testing the effect of a municipal level fiscal decentralization 
measurement, which stands for the municipally controlled share of local expenditures. 
The second one builds upon a proposal by Boex and Simatupang (2008) in measuring what 
they call "fiscal empowerment", which stands for the actual "individual's empowerment 
over each per-capita peso being spent". Above measurements are used both individually 
as well interactively to estimate en empirical model that explains municipal schools' 
scores in the so called SIMCE test, which is annually taken by 4th degree students. 
 The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the current 
academic debate on the subject matter, section III describes the empirical model and 
section  IV summarizes the estimation and main results. Finally, section V presents the 
conclusions. 
 
II. The debate. 
 
A variety of pro decentralization hypothesis have been developed in the literature. Most 
popular arguments hinge upon information advantages (Von Hayek 1945), the potential 
for market like competition across local governments (Tiebout 1956, Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980, Tirole 1994), and the likely benefit in political accountability that 
decentralization may bring about (e.i.Seabright 1996). Counter arguments highlight the 
lack of skilled personnel and genuinely democratic practices at the local level in 
developing countries (Prud'homme 1995), the likelihood of decentralization leading to 
costly public goods resulting from too small scale operations (Oates 2001), the danger of 
weak jurisdictions being potentially subject to “elite capture” (Bardhan y Mookherjee 
2006) and the possible segregation against poorer jurisdictions (Bonet 2006, Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra 2009). As far as education is concerned, decentralization is assumed to 
strengthen service providers’ responsiveness to local needs by making them more 
accountable to clients, which may be channeled through more school choice, increasing 
participation and increasing voice (World Bank 2004).   
 
Generally, cross country studies appear to support the view that decentralization 
enhances education quality (Letelier 2010, 2012; Lindaman  and  Thurmaier 2002; 
Busemeyer 2008). Nevertheless, country case evidence is rather mixed. While positive 
effects from some kind of decentralization on schools performance has been found for 
Switzerland (Barankay and Lockhood 2007), Bolivia and Colombia (Faguet and Sánchez  
2007),  no conclusive evidence exists for Sweden (Ahlin  and  Mork 2008). Yet another 
group of studies finds that decentralization deepens the educational gap between poor 
and wealthy jurisdictions, this being the case of China (Zhao 2009) and El Salvador 
(Cuéllar-Marchelli 2003). To the extent that decentralization promotes competition across 
schools and neighboring jurisdictions, this potential quality improving  effect has been extensively 
researched in the  USA case (Belfield and Levin 2002, Kaustav et. al. 2012, Juliana et. al. 2012) and 
Sweden (e.i.Sandstromand  Bergstrom2005). While that evidence generally supports the 
competition hypothesis, some concern exits on the chance that increasing free school choice may 
lead to some kind of social or even grades segregation (Östh. al. 2013).  When it comes to the 
more specific question as to whether decentralization does favor accountability and local 
governments’ responsiveness to people’s educational demands, existing evidence is scant 
and even more inconclusive. Evidence from China shows that additional fiscal autonomy 
given to local governments results in a lower share of total expenditure being made on 
education (Zheng and Zhao 2013), which may be interpreted as a sign of fiscal 
decentralization not having a pro accountability effect.  However, a comprehensive review 
by Bruns et. al. (2011) shows that accountability matters but it does so in a school based 
decentralization context in which teachers are directly accountable to parents. 
 
Concerning the Chilean case, some stylized facts suggest that fiscal decentralization does 
not enhance MSs' performance (Larrañaga1995, Parry 1997a, Parry 1997b). Nevertheless, 
a study by Contreras and Macías (2002) finds systematic differences on MSs’ performance 
across the territory, which points out to some municipal specific type of explanation, as 
such a pattern does not appear to hold for PSs. In line with the view that real municipal 
autonomy is an attribute worth having, some stress the advantages of PSs managers 
having enough  leeway to decide on their budget and teaching personnel (Sapelli 2003, 
Paredes and Paredes 2009). Although some evidence suggests that school providers do 
compete with each other (Auguste and  Valenzuela, 2003), such a competition seems to be  
stronger in between PSs (Larrañaga, 2004), or even within MSs  that face a hard budget constraint 
(Gallego 2005). 
 
While parents' choice has been perfected over time, most free of charge schooling options 
have a low quality record (Elacqua and Martìnez 2011), tend to  benefit more educated 
and well informed families (Fischer et. al. 2006, Gershberg et. al. 2012), and have a 
significant students’ segregation bias (Elacqua 2012). But yet, no clear cut evidence on the 
Chilean case exists that relates parents’ choice with educational outcomes (Hsieh and 
Urquiola 2005, Carrasco and San Martin 2012). 
 
Expectedly, students' family background is an internationally recognized variable to 
explaining school performance (Woessmann 2003,  Hanushek and Woessmann 2011). 
Along similar lines, direct comparison between MSs and PSs in Chile shows that albeit PSs 
rank higher in the national tests scores, that gap diminishes when students’ social 
background in the two types of schools is properly accounted for  (Aedo and Larrañaga, 
1995;Mizala et. al., 2005). 
 
III. Empirical model. 
 
Equation 1 (Ec1) bellow provides the basic structure of the empirical model. This is meant 
to explain the score of the “SIMCE” test, which is annually taken at private and municipal 
schools alike. Explanatory variables are sorted out in two groups. One is assumed to 
capture the potential municipal fiscal capacity (MFC) to attend specific local expenditure 
demands. The second  type (CONTROL) is a set of environmental variables that may affect 
test scores other than MFC. 
 
1.21 EcCONTROLMFCSCORE itititit    
 
As far as a suitable proxy for MFC is concerned, two approaches are followed. On the one 
hand, we follow Barankay y Lockhood (2007) in using a municipal specific measurement of 
fiscal decentralization (FD), this being the share of municipally controlled expenditures. In 
our case, this equals     =  
     
  
 , in which Ri stands for net of transfers municipal 
budget revenues and Wi is the plant contract staff's payroll. Alternatively, we build upon a 
proposal by Boex and Simatupang (2008) in producing a municipal specific accountability 
corrected "fiscal empowerment" index. In adapting Boex and Simatupang’s frame to our 
case, we define “Municipal Fiscal Empowerment” (Ei) as the interaction between 
residents' voice (Vi) and municipal expenditures (MEXi), so that the following is in order: 
 
   =    ×      		=    × (   ∗   )											 . 2  
 
Where gi is local expenditure per head and Pi  is the municipal population. As for "voice", 
this is defined as    =
 
 
 
    
 , where    		stands  for the speed at which municipal 
government’s accountability (voice) diminishes as local Pi   rises. If we substitute the local 
population by the local constituency (ji), the ratio between the "effective" and the "voice 
corrected" expenditure (E/g) can be expressed as: 
 
  
=
 
 
 
  
, which stands as our optional 
measurement of MFC. 
As for CONTROL variables, municipality’s socio economic characteristics are being 
measured by households’ income (inc), parents' years of education (p.educ), and a 
municipal urbanization rate (urban). Remaining control variables include the rate of 
students per teacher (stud/teach),   the number of schools being run by the municipality 
at stake (n.schools) and the average SIMCE score by PSs in that particular municipal 
district (simce.sub). We assume that a higher simce.sub promotes a more competitive 
environment among schools’ providers, which leads to a better municipal school 
performance. 
 
 
IV. Estimation and results. 
A municipal based panel between 2005 and 2011 is used to estimate the empirical model 
defined above. All 345 municipal governments are represented.  Data is taken from the 
Ministry of Interior Affair and Public Order’s data base (SINIM), and the National 
Household Survey for the years 2006-2011 (CASEN). SIMCE scores are available from the 
Ministry of Education. An obvious challenge though, is the estimation of a proxy for   .  
While municipal residents' utility function is not observable, it will be assumed that more 
preference heterogeneity is positively associated with the degree of "households' incomes 
dispersion", which can be measured through the local GINI coefficient. As far as the 
political dimension is concerned, it will be asserted that municipal government's 
accountability will be lower the higher the ratio of "residents per municipal council 
member" and the larger the "concentration of specific party member representatives at 
the municipal council". Highly uneven political representation at the council level is 
assumed to induce a monopolistic behavior toward local constituents, which lowers 
residents' voice. This is measured through a council level Herfindahl index which is meant 
to capture council members’ political dispersion. We combine above three variables to 
produce a factor analysis based index which proxies			  .  In order to get consistent values 
of      , the estimated “factor” is then rescaled to fit between 0.0 and 0.5, which is in line 
with Boex and Simatupang (2008) simulation analysis. 
Two sets of regressions are run by using the average SIMCE score, and the specific math 
and language scores separately (table 1). In both cases, endogenous variables and some of 
the exogenous ones are expressed in logs ("L"). Two sets of regressions are reported. In 
the first set, variables FD and E/g have been included separately. The second set includes 
an interaction term between them. In all cases, the  fixed effect model was chosen on the 
basis of the Hausman test, so that random effect regressions are not reported. 
The first result worth mentioning is the fact that regardless of the type of SIMCE score 
being looked upon and the use of FD and E/g individually - as opposed to the interaction 
term, both measurements of fiscal responsiveness are significant. This suggests that more 
accountable and fiscally decentralised municipalities perform better. Second, 
socioeconomic variables are globally as well as are individually significant.  Interestingly, 
the effect of parents' education seems to be stronger in math than in language. Albeit 
urban located schools appear to perform better, this effect is only significant in the 
language case. Concerning the competition effect from PSs, this is significant and positive 
as expected. Higher PSs scores are clearly associated with higher municipal schools scores. 
Expectedly, as students per teacher rises, SIMCE score diminishes, albeit this effect 
appears to be weak in math. Finally, the negative and significant coefficient of n.schools 
reveals that benefits from municipal decentralization diminish as the same municipal 
administration encompasses numerous education units. 
 
Tabla 1. Regresiones para el SIMCE promedio de establecimientos municipales, 2005-2011.  
 Average Average Math Math Lang Lang 
constant 
 
4.268*** 
(26.16) 
4.345*** 
(27.66) 
4.324*** 
(22.95) 
4.396*** 
(24.25) 
4.216*** 
(26.13) 
4.299*** 
(27.58) 
E/g 0.171*** 
(5.87) 
 0.093*** 
(2.75) 
 0.245*** 
(8.51) 
 
FD 0.079* 
(1.79) 
 0.084* 
(1.65) 
 0.075* 
(1.72) 
 
( / ) ×     
0.169*** 
(5.71) 
 
0.106*** 
(3.11) 
 
0.228*** 
(7.79) 
L (inc) 
0.048*** 
(6.41) 
0.045*** 
(6.16) 
0.043*** 
(4.93) 
0.042*** 
(5.01) 
0.053*** 
(7.17) 
0.048*** 
(6.58) 
p.educ 
0.006*** 
(2.64) 
0.006*** 
(2.75) 
0.009*** 
(3.24) 
0.009*** 
(3.25) 
0.004 
(1.61) 
0.004* 
(1.80) 
urban 
0.001 
(1.17) 
0.001 
(1.16) 
0.0003 
(0.51) 
0.0003 
(0.52) 
0.001* 
(1.76) 
0.001* 
(1.72) 
L (stud/teach) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.029*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
-0.006 
(-0.62) 
-0.043*** 
(-5.26) 
-0.051*** 
(-6.29) 
L (simce.sub) 
0.175*** 
(7.41) 
0.182*** 
(7.85) 
0.156*** 
(5.74) 
0.157*** 
(5.86) 
0.191*** 
(8.21) 
0.206*** 
(8.92) 
L (n.schools) 
-0.094*** 
(-5.06) 
-0.095*** 
(-5.12) 
-0.076*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.077*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.111*** 
(-6.01) 
-0.113*** 
(-6.10) 
       
Observaciones 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,733 1,733 
F test  50.44*** 57.07*** 25.64*** 29.33*** 73.85*** 82.03*** 
Wald Chi2       
F test that all u_i=0: 6.82*** 6.81*** 6.36*** 6.41*** 6.12*** 6.04*** 
Chi2`s Hausman test 58.06*** 50.09*** 27.05*** 22.41*** 99.25*** 87.06*** 
F test: Emp. and DF vars. 18.07*** 32.66*** 4.78*** 9.67*** 75.72*** 64.18*** 
F test: socioeco. var. 29.14*** 27.99*** 22.31*** 22.82*** 140.96*** 130.58*** 
F test: municipal vars. 36.15*** 42.64*** 17.97*** 19.11*** 186.65*** 216.87*** 
Significant at 10% *, 5% **, 1% ***. 
T statistic in parenthesis 
 
V. Conclusions. 
An empirical municipal data based model is estimated in order to test the hypothesis that  
more fiscal capacity enhances the quality of municipal school administration. In so doing, 
we provide evidence that local fiscal decentralization as well as "voice corrected" 
municipal expenditure per head have a significant effect in explaining MSs performance. 
Complementary, a set of control variables in the regression analysis suggest that socio 
economic factors such as parents' education and households' income do favor schools’ 
performance. A rather mild positive impact was detected in the case of urbanization. 
Finally, albeit competition from PSs appears to affect MSs scores positively, benefits from 
a fiscally decentralized administration of public schools seem to get lower the higher the 
number of schools being attended by the same municipal government. 
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